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Abstract  
 
With no formal division between majority and opposition in the parliamentary arena, 
the European Union (EU) calls for an approach to political opposition which considers 
the role of civil society. This article explores the case of opposition to the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) within and without the European Parliament 
(EP) through a political process approach, using the case to reflect on conditions for 
effective opposition in the EU. The ACTA campaign saw opposed actors within the EP 
and digital rights groups work together to build coalitions against ACTA. Protests then 
opened the way for these groups to broker a change of position among other 
actors, allowing a majority rejection. The ACTA case suggests the need for advocacy 
by organised groups both within and without the Parliament to construct majorities. 
Comparisons to similarly successful campaigns bolster this view, as do examples of 
less effective opposition.  
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the conditions for effective opposition in the 
EU multi-level polity. Since the foundational works of Sartori, Dahl and Shapiro 
research on political opposition has not seen any major renewal, and largely remains 
confined to the notion of highly institutionalised forms of opposition in parliaments as 
closed arenas (Weinblum and Brack 2011). With no formal division between majority 
(or government) and opposition in the parliamentary arena, the European Union (EU) 
calls for a novel approach to political opposition which considers the role of 
contestation by organised groups within civil society. In this regard, research on 
social movements has undergone two major developments over the past two 
decades. The emergence of transnational movements and organisations has been 
seen as an adaptational response to the rising power of global governance and 
international institutions, or, in Europe, the continuous institutionalisation of the EU as 
genuine new polity (Kriesi and Rucht 1999; della Porta and Caiani 2009). At the same 
time, as Hutter (2014) notes, this research has become somewhat movement-centric 
in that scholars have been more interested in the organisational forms and dilemmas 
of movements themselves, leaving connections with institutionalised politics in the 
background.  
 
This paper is an attempt to bridge this gap. The concept of opposition is particularly 
suited to this because it targets impacts on decision-making and policy outcomes. At 
the same time, opposition is more specific than interest representation, which mostly 
refers to the degree and modalities of involvement of certain actors rather than their 
ability to impact decision making. The purpose of our twofold conceptualisation is to 
show how the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary components of opposition are 
interdependent with regard to their capacity to shape decision-making. Specialists 
of EU politics have stressed that the EU is a political system geared towards consensus 
in the centre in which dissenting voices are left at the margins of the decision making 
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process (Magnette 2010, Author 1). Others have shown how the technocratic style of 
policy making in the EU has brought about the professionalisation and 
bureaucratisation of interest groups (Saurugger 2008; Maloney 2008), including 
organisations representing diffuse citizens’ interests, which are often involved in 
contentious politics at the national level. While the success of opposition to EU 
policies seems rare, the question of under which scope conditions such opposition 
can emerge and be effective remains: under which circumstances can opposition 
contribute to reverse or shape decision-making? Building on the political opportunity 
structure framework, our argument is that opposition is most likely to succeed through 
a connection between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary mobilisation at the 
European level. More specifically, when it is involved in decision-making, the 
European Parliament (EP) provides crucial opportunities (in terms of access, allies 
and discourse) to contentious groups. The role of MEPs is relevant both in the 
microcosm of organised civil society in Brussels, and in terms of linkages with national 
arenas. More so than in national political systems, in Europe it is in the interests of 
parliamentarians and activists to cooperate if they want to succeed. While MEPs 
who oppose a policy initiative can use contention within civil society as leverage for 
achieving - necessarily ad hoc - broad opposition within the assembly, NGOs can 
gain direct access to decision making due to the role of the EP in the legislative 
process (through the ordinary legislative procedure or consent), and enhance the 
resonance of their claims. Besides the involvement of the EP, another scope 
condition for the connection to happen is therefore the level of politicisation and 
resonance within the public sphere, which facilitates the influence of allied 
parliamentarians and activists.  
 
This argument is substantiated by a two-fold strategy relying on a single case study 
and enlargement to further cases offering crucial comparative insights. First, the 
paper draws on documentary and field research conducted by both authors in 2012 
and 2013, including a series of 16 interviews with political actors and activists involved 
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in the debate, to show how the connection between extra-parliamentary opposition 
led to the rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement (ACTA) in July 2012. 
Claiming that it would be a major impediment to the trade in generic medicines and 
lead to the criminalisation of file sharing on the internet, opponents to ACTA 
convinced a majority of 478 against 39 (165 abstentions) to reject the international 
treaty, which had already been signed by the governments of 11 countries plus 22 EU 
Member States. Beyond the single case study, the paper will also illustrate the main 
argument with references to additional cases selected because they present a) a 
salient degree of public contestation outside of the parliamentary realm and b) a 
similar or contrasted opportunity structure as far as EP involvement is concerned. On 
the one hand, the Services directive and the Port directive show a similar connection 
between opposition outside and inside the parliamentary realm. On the other, the 
latest financial crisis offers a contrasting case where, against the background of 
intergovernmental management of the crisis, no such connection was forged as the 
EP was largely marginalised. Rather, where it reached the institutionalised political 
arena, protest led to the rise of new anti-establishment parties at the national level 
such as Podemos and Syriza, which failed to shape policy responses to the crisis.  
 
The first section of the paper presents the institutionalist approach, stressing the types 
of opportunities offered by the EU political system for the expression of opposition. 
Section 2 shows how, in this framework, opposition to ACTA progressively formed and 
succeeded in preventing ratification by the EU. Section 3 brings comparative insights 
in by showing how other cases support our argument. We contrast similar opportunity 
structures under co-decision (with the Services and Port directives) with the 
intergovernmental setting that characterises the macro-economic coordination 
regime aiming to enforce fiscal discipline in the aftermath of the debt crisis.  
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1.    The possibility of opposition in the EU: an institutionalist approach 
 
 
1.1   The EP as a key player of opposition 
 
The opportunity structure allowing efficient opposition in the EU cannot be reduced 
to the notion of a parliamentary group (or coalition of groups) opposing a majority. 
This section explains the inter- and intra- institutional dynamics of opposition, that is 
opposition between the EP as a whole and other institutions, as well as opposition 
within the assembly itself.  
 
The institutional rise of the EP has been the result of both the Parliament’s activism 
and the larger political context of integration. The struggle for more competences is 
part of the EP’s history of self-determination. Confined to a consultative role in the first 
European Treaties, its first victory was the introduction of the direct election of its 
members in 1979. Later, in the 1990s, the strengthening of parliamentarism at the EU 
level was considered as a strategy to tackle the perceived democratic deficit of the 
EU by decision makers (Costa and Magnette 2003; Rittberger 2005). Every treaty 
reform has granted more powers to the EP since the introduction of the co-decision 
procedure with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. The procedure made the Parliament 
the co-legislator of the Union on an equal footing with the Council of Ministers and all 
successive treaties have continuously extended the number of policy areas where 
decisions are made on the basis of co-decision. The entry into force of the Lisbon 
treaty in 2009 marks the latest climax of the EP’s rise. It makes co-decision the 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’ of the EU and enhances the EP’s role in policy 
domains previously considered as the Member States governments’ turf. 
International trade agreements are a case in point. Article 218 requires the EP’s 
approval for all agreements affecting policies where co-decision usually applies, in 
practice virtually every trade agreement. Thus, although the Council adopts trade 
agreements negotiated by the EU Commission, they have to pass through the 
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‘consent procedure’, which gives the EP the right to allow or reject such international 
treaties, as in the case of ACTA. 
 
Given that citizens are often out of reach and disinterested in the policy issues 
discussed in Brussels, ‘organised civil society’ has been used as a proxy for popular 
legitimation. All in all, members of the EP have developed a strong habitus (to borrow 
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept) of institutional self-assertion. This means that, more often 
than not, the assembly adopts a confrontational position towards proposals from the 
Commission and/or the position of the majority of governments within the Council. 
Inter-institutional confrontations are shaped by the logic of the co-decision or 
consent procedures, which stage a triangular dynamic between Commission, 
Council and Parliament. These inter-institutional dynamics of opposition between 
executive and legislative branches are not specific to the EU but can also be found, 
to various extents, in other federal systems such as Germany or the US. The desire to 
profile itself as a powerful actor within the institutional constellation becomes 
particularly acute when new competences are at stake. As stated in a note 
published by the EP’s Directorate General for external policies ‘The power of consent 
alone may, however, not be sufficient to rebalance powers between the EP and the 
Council. The potential for change lay, rather, in the ways in which Parliament would 
interpret and implement its new powers’ (EP 2014, 6). In that sense, it was clear that, 
since ACTA was the first treaty to be approved by the Parliament under the new 
Lisbon regime, institutional power relations were at stake.  
  
 
Compared with national parliaments, the peculiarity of the EP lies in the absence of 
any formal majority and opposition among its members. Rather, ad hoc majorities 
form on every legislative issue discussed. This fundamental feature brings about 
complex patterns of deliberation. First, far from being absent at the supranational 
level, the classical left-right pattern has (arguably) increasingly shaped EU legislative 
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politics (Hix and Roland 2006). On many issues, a left-wing bloc including the radical 
left (GUE), the Greens and the Social Democrats opposes the Conservatives, the 
Liberals and the Eurosceptics. In fact, the Liberals play a pivotal role in the centre, 
backing a more left-wing or right-wing majority. Nevertheless, the left-right cleavage 
is not so strong a structuring factor at the European level as it often is in national 
politics. In many respects, the EU can be described as a consociational polity where 
the claims of diverse groups or entities need to be taken into account 
(Papadopoulos and Magnette 2010). Thus, the left-right cleavage is often filtered by 
geographical cleavages (North-South, West-East), reflecting historical ties as well as 
different varieties of capitalism (see e.g. Author 1), that is contrasted conceptions of 
the appropriate role of the State and the Market. Finally, the inter-institutional 
dynamics described above often imply that the rapporteur of a particular proposal 
seeks to garner a broad majority in order to defend the EP’s position. This implies that 
European parliamentary politics are strongly geared towards the centre as, far from 
systematically opposing each other, the main political groups often find themselves 
voting together in the same ‘super majority’.  
 
 
1.2   Parliamentarism as a key opportunity for contentious politics 
 
These considerations of the EP’s intra- and inter-institutional cleavages and tensions 
form the basis of a political opportunity approach to explain aspects of civil society 
campaigning. Political opportunity approaches are used to explain the actions of 
social movements, seen as rational choices taken on the basis of perceived options 
shaped by political contexts. The more open a polity is to the claims of movements, 
for example, the less protest there is likely to be, while more unreceptive contexts 
(though stopping short of the most brutal repression) will see more. In order to avoid 
too vague a version of the approach (for an overview of critique see Meyer 2004) it is 
important to specify key contexts carefully: in this case the EP, with some 
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consideration of other relevant institutions. The Parliament provides two central 
opportunities for extra-parliamentary contentious groups: access to allies within the 
realm of institutionalised politics, and opportunities for mobilising people and 
increasing the resonance of an issue in the political sphere at large. These two 
opportunities are mutually reinforcing: the stronger the resonance and mobilisation 
of a campaign, the more access is likely, and more access in turn reinforces 
mobilisation and resonance.  
  
Within a political opportunity approach the EP is described as an attractive target for 
those seeking to influence EU policy. Not only is its power greater than that of many 
national parliaments (Greenwood 2011), it is also resource poor and thus open to 
receiving information from outside actors. Yet as an elected assembly, it is also a 
potential target for more unconventional, grassroots-oriented strategies that play on 
the perceived duties of MEPs to represent the wishes of their voters. Building on the 
previous discussion, the EP’s features as a key opposition player can be described in 
terms of political opportunity. Beginning with intra-institutional factors, because no 
single political grouping has ever formed an absolute majority in the Parliament and 
ideology plays a smaller role compared to many national settings, it can be 
expected that campaigning groups will play down ideological aspects of their 
claims, seeking instead to deploy arguments attractive to MEPs from a range of 
different political groupings that will allow an ad hoc coalition to form around their 
issue of interest. Layered over ideological differences are geographical cleavages, 
which also provide various opportunities. For the purposes of groups outside the EP, 
where an issue attracts attention in one or a number of member states and public 
opinion takes a clear direction, MEPs from those countries may follow an electoral 
logic and vote in the manner that will gain them the most support from citizens 
(Burstein 1999). Campaigning groups are thus likely to work to organise and extend 
expressions of public opinion including protest in order to then draw the attention of 
relevant MEPs to evidence of mobilisation, thus encouraging their response in line 
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with this vote-seeking logic. Geography may also be relevant where a particular 
policy will affect some member states more than others. Here again groups can be 
expected to seek to convince MEPs of a relevant nationality to act in line with this 
vote-seeking logic. In this view, public opinion is key to unlocking opportunities for 
campaigning groups: MEPs must be convinced that the public is on the side of the 
campaigning groups, and that it would be to their advantage to be seen to support 
their claims.  
 
The inter-institutional balance concerns the role of the EP as a whole within the 
balance of the EU’s ‘institutional triangle’ of Commission, Parliament and Council. In 
line with the logic whereby institutions seek to reinforce and expand their power, the 
EP can be seen as keen to acquire powers vis-a-vis the other European institutions (as 
suggested by the discussion above) as well as to exercise those it holds or has newly 
acquired. In terms of political opportunity, it is expected that the likelihood that 
groups will focus on the EP will increase not only with the actual power of the EP over 
a given issue, but also with the extent to which other institutions within the institutional 
triangle are seen to be closed. Opportunities for encouraging the EP to act in line 
with a logic of demonstrating its power within the institutional triangle can also be 
argued to increase where other EU institutions are seen as divided - this allows the EP 
to portray itself as a strong and decisive actor (and thus worthy of further powers) 
where others have failed. In addition, other supranational EU institutions have on 
occasion explicitly called on the EP to lead (or deferred any decision until the EP has 
taken a stance) where deadlock has been reached or the institution in question 
wishes to take some political distance from the issue (see the discussions on ACTA 
and the Services directive below). 
  
In terms of the strategies predicted in line with this political opportunity structure of 
the EP, these cleavages give some clear ideas. As noted, in a more general sense 
the EP provides both institutional channels of access but also invites more 
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unconventional forms of action. Groups exploiting institutional channels are likely to 
avoid allying themselves too closely or publicly with any one political grouping, 
playing down traditionally ideological elements of their argumentation. This strategy 
allows the duplication of material used to target the Commission, which similarly 
demands a step back from ideology and a language of expertise. Where groups 
draw on national membership, they are likely to mobilise these in order to play the 
geography card at the European level. New technologies may be helpful here (e-
mail campaigns and petitions are often seen). More unconventional strategies 
including protest may also be used in this vein, and overall in an effort to convince 
MEPs that public opinion has been piqued - by acting from the ‘bottom up’ 
campaigning groups seek to exploit the re-election concerns of parliamentarians. 
These strategies are also the most logical to appeal to the Council of Ministers and 
European Council where very little institutional access is available at the European 
level.   
 
In a nutshell, the connection between extra-parliamentary and parliamentary 
opposition to policies initiated by the Commission and Council in the EU relies on a 
mutual self-interested strategy by the EP and campaigning groups. On the one 
hand, MEPs seek to draw their power and legitimacy from the idea that they 
represent voters and voice the concerns of ‘organised civil society’. On the other 
hand, contentious groups and organisations seek to gain access to decision-making 
and resonance for their claims. Combining these views illustrates how campaigning 
groups act regarding decision-making procedures where the importance of the EP is 
perceived as high. We thus argue on the basis of the discussions outlined above that 
the EP is an attractive institutional ally for campaigning groups where it is seen as a 
powerful actor – as is often the case in co-decision procedures and where it has a 
newly acquired power as in the ACTA case. Building alliances with (parts of) this 
institution in situations where it has more often than not pitted itself against other EU 
institutions of a different view (and indeed formed alliances with parts of other EU 
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institutions less accessible to civil society groups that support it, see Servent and 
Trauner 2014) makes sense and is one way in which campaigning groups hope to 
and on occasion have wielded influence over EU decisions. We now move on to 
illustrate this with reference to the campaign against ACTA. 
 
  
2.    How ACTA was defeated 
 
Opposition to ACTA first emerged with regard to transparency between the 
European Commission and the EP. In 2008, Wikileaks had released documents 
authored by the US government, bringing evidence that information about ongoing 
negotiations had been made available to private lobbies representing the industries 
active in the culture and property rights sectors, but not to associations representing 
public interests. These leaked documents saw the beginning of civil society 
campaigns against ACTA. For campaigning groups, a focus on the EP made sense 
both for inter-institutional reasons - the Commission was seen as hostile to discussions, 
and the Council composed of governments that had for the most part signed ACTA1 
- and because its new power gave it a say in the ACTA process. Thus, in early 2010 an 
informal alliance was struck between campaigning groups and members of the 
Greens-EFA political group. The ranks of this group had recently been swelled by two 
new Swedish Pirate Party members, an event which coincided with the appointment 
of an advisor on Internet policy, a seasoned activist with previous experience of 
political campaigning who was quick to set up a wiki on ACTA issues after a decision 
had been taken by the Greens-EFA internet core group2. Existing links between these 
MEPs and campaigning groups including La Quadrature du Net (QdN, European 
Digital Rights (Edri), Access Now, and the Foundation for a Free Information 
                                               
1 Interview with representative of Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure (FFII), by telephone May 
2013. 
2 Interview with board member of the Swedish Pirate Party, Brussels, June 2013. 
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Infrastructure (FFII) were thus activated for ACTA and extended to interested MEPs, 
initially within the Greens-EFA and later to other groups.3 
 
When ACTA was placed on the agenda of the EP, digital rights groups including QdN 
thus worked with the Greens-EFA group4 to raise awareness of the opacity 
surrounding the agreement5 and to convince other MEPs to sign a resolution to that 
effect (Author 2). It was thus the opacity of the negotiations that first brought about 
resentment among parliamentarians in the EP, placing the origins of the institution’s 
opposition to ACTA both in an inter-institutional perspective and in line with the 
discussion above arguing the EP’s mission to present itself as a defender of citizens’ 
interests. With regard to the latter, QdN brought local activists to the offices of MEPs 
to urge them to sign the resolution (thus also exploiting the geographical cleavage), 
and debates surrounding the question of the Commission’s transparency over ACTA 
documents were framed by MEPs using the notions of transparency and democracy. 
At this stage, discussions on ACTA did not focus on its actual content, which allowed 
the coalition between digital rights groups and opposed groups within the EP to build 
a cohesive and widespread alliance to confront the EU Commission and fight the 
battle for asserting its new competence. The resolution demanding transparency 
and full access to all documents regarding ACTA was signed by a large majority of 
MEPs6.  
 
Throughout 2010 and 2011, intra-institutional dynamics came into play as a dividing 
line emerged between the left-wing groups within the assembly (with the Greens-EFA 
in particular allied with digital rights groups) and their right-wing counterparts. In 2010, 
                                               
3 Interview with MEP, Christian Engstrom, Brussels, June 2013. 
4 Interview with representative of La Quadrature du Net, Paris, June 2013. 
5 In the first version of ACTA sent by the Commission to the EP, for example, many passages were redacted 
(interview with assistant of MEP Marc Tarabella, Brussels, November 2012). 
6 European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2010 on the transparency and state of play of the ACTA 
negotiations, available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-
0058+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
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when the EP was to issue a resolution on the content of ACTA, opponents were in a 
minority within the assembly. The resolution drafted by the opposition coalition was 
rejected, and the joint resolution of the European People’s Party (EPP) and the 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) adopted. The latter stressed that ACTA 
was useful to fight counterfeiting and support a level playing field for producers, 
sustain employment, and promote the rule of law7. Yet when a second draft of the 
agreement was sent to the EP by the Commission inconsistencies fed suspicion that 
passages likely to fuel opposition among MEPs could have been removed8. While 
nobody opposed the fight against counterfeiting (although concerns remained for 
generic medicines), the inclusion of a chapter on digital products and the sharing of 
files protected by copyrights caused concern. A number of MEPs within left-wing 
political groups suspected that multinational companies had lobbied governments 
for the penalisation of individual practices on the Internet, and to oblige providers to 
act as agents of surveillance9.  
 
Months later, in Winter 2011, a small group of Greens and Social Democrats in the EP 
began to organise their own informal discussions on ACTA10. They were soon joined 
by an increasing number of MEPs, including Polish members of the EPP. Beyond the 
left-right dividing line, the issue of digital rights brought about strong mobilisation in 
Central and Eastern Europe, likely inspired by widespread and widely covered 
protests against the Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect Intellectual Property Act 
(SOPA and PIPA) in the United States. In the region, the Internet is regarded as a 
space for citizens’ freedom which contrasts with the authoritarian Communist past. 
These protests, though in no way organised by the campaigning groups informally 
                                               
7 European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2010 on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 
P7_TA(2010)0432.  
8  Interview with a parliamentary assistant, Brussels, November 2012 (1). 
9 Some articles of the agreement referred to the possibility for providers to watch e-mail communication or the 
possibilities for national authorities to conduct controls for transport of illegal digital goods at borders.  
10 Among whom Marc Tarabella (S&D, BE), Sandrine Bélier (Verts/ALE, FR), Bernd Lange (S&D, DE). 
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allied with the Greens-EFA, brought a host of new opportunities to build a wider ad 
hoc alliance against ACTA within the EP.  
First, the protests saw a string of national politicians publically distance themselves 
from ACTA in early 2012. On 31 January 2012 the Slovenian ambassador to Japan 
(where ACTA was signed) stated that she had ‘signed ACTA out of civic 
carelessness’11. On 3 February Poland halted ratification due to ‘insufficient 
consultations’ prior to signing, while Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Germany, Slovakia and Slovenia now signalled that they had stopped ratification (or 
signature in the case of Germany) processes. On 17 February, the Polish prime 
minister announced that Poland would not ratify ACTA at all, while Germany stated 
that it would await the outcome of the EP’s vote before taking a decision on 
signature. This gave campaigning groups two opportunities, since these events sent 
a clear message to the EP that their vote would count and give an opportunity to 
show its worth in an inter-institutional perspective against a split Council. First, groups 
with grassroots links in addition to their supranational activities, particularly QdN and 
indeed the Pirate Party, now worked with protesting groups. Protests later spread 
further to the west of the Union, with 120 cities involved in the Day of Action against 
ACTA on 9 June 2012.  
Second, the protests indirectly created more specific opportunities to work within the 
EP by sparking political moves within the institution in a climate of increase media 
coverage. Weeks after protests began, the EP’s rapporteur for ACTA, Social 
Democrat French MEP Kader Arif, resigned. This move attracted some media 
coverage given the existing interest sparked by the protest wave and the 
accusations levelled by Arif, who stated  
‘As the Rapporteur on this agreement, I had to face unprecedented 
manoeuvres from the right of this Parliament which sought to impose an 
                                               
11 ‘A New Question of Internet Freedom’. The New York Times, 05/02/2012. Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/technology/06iht-acta06.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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accelerated calendar aiming at passing ACTA as soon as possible before 
public opinion could be alerted thus depriving the Parliament from its right of 
expression and from the tools allowing it to voice citizens’ claims’12. 
The protests and their aftermath had thus also opened up opportunities for 
campaigning groups to get their point across by increasing public awareness and 
opinion against ACTA, making the EP more susceptible to arguments designed to 
appeal to its desire to be seen as the champion of citizens’ rights. Campaigning 
groups at this point were indeed lobbying strategically within the EP, with groups 
considered more ‘expert’ and less overtly political, such as Edri, now targeting more 
receptive members of the EPP, and more grassroots groups targeting still undecided 
members of the Social Democrat and Liberal groups according to the geographical 
cleavage. Their efforts were also assisted by national politics coming into play within 
the EP itself. For example, Sergei Stanishev, for former Prime Minister of Bulgaria and 
newly appointed President of the Party of European Socialists (PES), the campaign 
against ACTA enabled him to profile himself as an opponent to the Bulgarian 
President Plevneliev who supported the agreement. Stanishev worked to consolidate 
opposition to ACTA within the PES at a point in time where no major political group in 
the EP had officially taken a stance against it13. Meanwhile, Kader Arif’s successor, 
the British MEP David Martin, sought to consolidate opposition to ACTA within the 
Group of the Progressive Alliance of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D). During 
internal debates, members from the Labour Party declared that they were not 
bound by the position of the Europarty as their Finnish, Austrian and Danish 
colleagues, whose parties belonged to government coalitions which had signed the 
agreement, were. A number of members from Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, 
Portugal) were also in favour of an agreement which would strengthen sanctions 
against counterfeiting (notably with regard to the textile industry)14. David Martin and 
                                               
12 Kader Arif, Press release, excerpt from Blog Mediapart, 12.02.2012. Availabe at: 
http://blogs.mediapart.fr/blog/jean-paul-baquiast/140212/les-manifestations-contre-le-traite-acta. 
13 Interview with Deputy Secretary General of the Party of European Socialists, Brussels, October 2012. 
14 Interview with assistant of MEP Bernd Lange, Brussels, November 2012.  
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Bernd Lange, coordinator of the S&D Group for trade, therefore decided to organise 
a series of debates and consultations in order to strengthen the group’s critical 
stance towards ACTA, creating new lobbying opportunities for the digital rights 
groups.  
Both groups embraced opposition in April 2012 and support for the agreement 
progressively weakened even among the Conservatives. In the course of these few 
months, civil society groups worked hard, exploiting various opportunities linked to 
the cleavages that characterise the EP, to forge an ad hoc coalition amongst MEPs 
to oppose ACTA. This led the EP to make a historical move given that the assembly 
has only rejected about a dozen pieces of legislation since its first direct election in 
1979. The next section turns to evaluate our argument on the importance of the 
connection between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition for 
campaigns seeking to influence the decisions of the EP.   
 
3.    Discussion and comparative perspectives  
 
 
3.1   Co-decision and successful campaigns 
  
While the consent procedure featured in the ACTA case is mainly used for 
international agreements, and hence less common, co-decision is the ordinary 
legislative procedure which places the EP on an equal footing as a legislator 
alongside the Council of ministers. In contrast with the consent procedure, co-
decision therefore allows MEPs to shape legislation through amendments. This 
constitutes a major opportunity for groups outside the Parliament to contest certain 
aspects of proposed legislation.  
 
One prominent case of successful opposition to a policy initiative is the mobilisation 
campaign against the Services directive between 2004 and 2006 (Author 1, Author 
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2). The directive proposal by the EU Commission foresaw far-reaching liberalisation 
and deregulation of all services activities, including a number of public services. 
Moreover, the so-called country of origin principle allowed service providers to offer 
services in any EU country on the basis of the rules and regulations of the country in 
which the company established its headquarters. These provisions in particular 
triggered fears among unions and left-wing politicians that the directive would foster 
the relocation of services companies as well as social, wage and regulatory 
dumping due to the activity of workers from the new member states of Central and 
Eastern Europe in the West. A broad left-wing coalition (including Greens, 
Communists, Social Democrats, unions and the alterglobalists of ATTAC) led a vocal 
campaign with a main framing opposing the defence of ‘Social Europe’ against the 
detrimental effects of the ‘Neo-liberal EU’ embodied by the Dutch Commissioner for 
the Internal market Frits Bolkestein. After 2 years of mobilisation, the Rapporteur on 
the proposal, the Social Democrat Evelyn Gebhardt, obtained substantial 
modifications of the Commission’s proposal, softening its impact on public services 
and its deregulation effects with regard to social standards. This contentious episode 
can therefore be seen as a success of contestation through the connection 
between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition.  
 
Another comparable case explored by one of the authors in parallel to Bolkestein 
elsewhere is that of the Port directive. Broad opposition including popular protests by 
dock workers saw the EP reject this directive outright not once but twice, in late 2003 
and again in 2006. The story here is comparable to ACTA, involving the construction 
of a coalition within the EP to reject the directive. The campaign was carried out by 
a broad and varied coalition comprising groups from sections of industry and trade 
unions, and involved popular protest, which ‘created a critical mass to convince the 
MEPs to vote down the Port Directive’ (Author 2). The Port directive was also 
observed to involve the EP acting according to the logic of the inter-institutional 
balance discussed earlier. With the introduction of the second iteration of the 
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directive, the EP was particularly unimpressed that the Commission had not taken 
note of painstakingly negotiated compromises achieved in the ultimately rejected 
first version. Comparing Bolkestein and the Port case, the authors note that the 
‘importance of gaining the Parliament as an ally in campaigns involving legislation 
under the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ thus seems clear’ (author 2).  
 
Studies of campaigns that have failed to leave a mark on EU policies also 
corroborate our argument about the importance of convergence between 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition. Bieler’s study of the Coalition for 
Green and Social Procurement, for example, concludes that an important reason for 
the ultimate failure of this campaign was an over-reliance on lobbying to the 
detriment of protest (2011, 177). Outside the realm of trade union campaigning, 
elements contributing to the shortcomings of a campaign by environmental and 
public health groups on the EU chemicals regulation (REACH) included both a lack 
of protest strategies and enough allies within the EP to overcome coalitions brokered 
by the industry counter-campaign (author 2). A quantitative study on interest group 
influence in the EU analysing 69 legislative acts finds that citizen groups fomenting 
conflict alongside allies in EU institutions are more successful in terms of their impacts 
on EU legislation than business groups, providing more robust evidence for our 
argument (Dür, Bernhagen and Marshall 2013). However, most of the evidence dates 
from before the financial crisis. A consideration of the effects of the crisis on the 
political opportunity structure of the EU is thus presented in the following section. 
 
3.2   Intergovernmental politics and fragmented protest 
 
The purpose of this final section is to provide a contrasted case where, although 
extra-parliamentary opposition to the policies of the EU has been significant, it has 
failed to impact decisions made by the institutions of the EU. This is so, we argue, 
because the financial crisis accounts for a different opportunity structure where the 
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EP has been widely marginalised thus precluding contentious claims to be 
channelled.  
The financial crisis that began in earnest in the EU around 2008, affecting certain EU 
member states  (such as Greece, Spain and Italy) with devastating force from about 
2010, led to the implementation of an austerity agenda of cuts across the EU. Protests 
against this austerity agenda spread, adopting an innovative format inspired by 
movements in Iceland and across the Middle East (most prominently perhaps the 
occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo) in the so-called ‘Indignados’ and Occupy 
movements. These mass protests, ostensibly against the austerity agenda, though 
more fundamentally concerned with democratic systems perceived to have 
allowed such a collapse in the first place (Kaldor, Selchow and Murray-Leach 2015; 
Ancelovici 2015) swept across Europe in 2011 before spreading to the US. The 
protests were characterised by the extensive use of social media in their organisation 
and diffusion, and by the occupations of public spaces in several member states of 
the EU. Within these camps, which often endured for several months, protesters 
exercised a ‘prefigurative politics’, organising themselves along the horizontal and 
open lines of the sort of democracy they wished to see practiced more widely in 
their countries (see for example Flesher Fominaya and Cox 2013; Kaldor, Selchow 
and Murray-Leach 2015)15. 
These rather introspective movements (the lack of clear claims made by the 
protesters confounded much of the mainstream media), with their highly localised 
physical presence in terms of their location in defined areas within which they 
rejected formal systems and developed their own micro-direct democratic systems, 
                                               
15 There were of course important differences in the forms and scope of different national protests, which 
Ancelovici explains through a consideration of specific member states political opportunity structures. 
Nevertheless, some preoccupation with representative democracy can be found to characterise these protests 
considered as a whole. In Italy, for example, similar messages to those emanating from the Occupy/Indignados 
camps were found in a range of protests including those against government corruption, personalised laws, and 
the privatisation of public services (author 2).  
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and often provided an array of local services, present some clear contrasts when we 
consider the last major protest wave in the EU (and beyond), the global justice 
movement (GJM). The GJM, in addition to its more global focus expressed through 
transnational protest and discussion gatherings at social forums, included in its 
network groups that engaged with the EU, including many of the groups (for 
example a range of trade unions and ATTAC) that were pivotal in the campaigns 
against the Bolkestein and Port directives discussed earlier. As seen, although these 
campaigns did involve protest and other contentious forms of dissent, they also 
relied on the advocacy work of well-rooted and expert groups based for the most 
part in the European capital of Brussels. This is a link that appears to be missing when 
we consider the wave of occupation movements: here protests were not only 
localised but protesters had no vision akin to the GJM’s slogan of ‘another Europe is 
possible’. ‘Europe’ in general was viewed as a space where politics and the market 
had become entwined to the extent that markets now dictated economic policy 
decisions in the political sphere (often via heavy lobbying, see Crouch 2012, or via 
the creation of technical agencies including the European Central Bank, see e.g. 
Stiglitz 2012). These decisions, it was felt, should instead be the product of democratic 
debate (for an extensive discussion, see della Porta 2015). Europe was thus rejected 
(or not even considered) as the conduit for any possible solution (Kaldor, Selchow 
and Murray-Leach 2015). 
This general shift from the GJM to camps in the EU can thus be read as a perceived 
closure of political opportunities at the EU level in the eyes of protesters (Author 2). It 
is also a perception with some concrete evidence in institutional changes at the EU 
level in the context of the crisis. Indeed, changes in the institutional setting of the EU 
are not very conducive for transnational opposition at the EU level. The obstacles to 
transnational opposition, and in particular popular mobilisation, have always been 
seen as substantial (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Marks and McAdam 2009). Nevertheless 
recent changes can be read as exacerbating these. The major decisions that led to 
the setup of financial instruments such as the European Financial Stability Facility 
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(EFSF), that is the bailouts for Greece and Ireland, were for example taken for the 
most part in bilateral Franco-German summits. More generally, all the discussions that 
led to the reform of the European Monetary Union resulted from intergovernmental 
discussions. The reaction to the financial crisis has thus been overwhelmingly 
intergovernmental. This has been perpetuated in the setup of the new governance 
framework for macro-economic coordination, known as the European Semester. The 
European Commission is in charge of monitoring the economic and social situation in 
the member states and formulating country specific recommendations which are 
then endorsed by all governments gathered in the Council. These recommendations 
urge national governments to reduce their deficits and debt through policies such as 
the flexibilisation of labour markets, reform of pensions systems, and cuts in the 
provision of public services. The important point for our purposes here is that this 
process mainly involves national governments (including gathered in the Council) 
and the EU Commission. Hence, in contrast with the ordinary legislative procedure 
(formerly co-decision), the EP is marginalised and has little to no say in these 
processes. The opportunities provided by parliamentary politics are therefore no 
longer available to groups that want to contest policy decisions over socio-
economic policies. Again, this can be argued to be a situation that has essentially 
always existed in the EU – changes achieved in campaigns such as those discussed 
here could be dismissed as cosmetic, since they do not affect the overall agenda of 
the EU and successive legislation will bring in the undesired changes in any case. 
Nevertheless this institutional closing of opportunities is more concrete, and one that 
we argue is understood by recent protesters precisely in this way and reflected in the 
return of protest to the local level. It is in this separation of EU advocacy and popular 
protest that we can find some potential explanation for the gap between the 
organised opposition to ACTA clustered around the EP and the protest groups – most 
likely acting in the wake of protests against SOPA and PIPA in the United States – that 
proved pivotal in the Parliament’s rejection of the Agreement. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have explored the case of opposition to the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement from within and without the European Parliament through a 
political process approach, using this case to reflect on the conditions for effective 
opposition in the EU multi-level polity. Such a reflection is important and relevant, first 
because there is no formal division between majority and opposition in the EP, 
necessitating a novel approach to political opposition that brings contestation from 
outside Parliaments into the equation and second because much of the current 
literature tends to consider opposition in the parliamentary arena and outside it in 
isolation. The pending negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) can be seen as yet another case showing the powerful relevance 
of reflecting on this twofold process of opposition in the EU. 
 
The ACTA campaign saw a small core of opposition within the EP and a number of 
digital rights groups outside the EP work together in an attempt to build coalitions 
against the agreement within the EP, newly endowed with the power to withhold 
consent for the signature of international trade agreements. The outbreak of protests 
in Poland which spread across the Union opened the way for these groups to broker 
a change of position in other Parliamentary groupings that allowed a majority 
rejection of the Agreement. In terms of conditions for effective opposition via the EP, 
the ACTA case thus suggests the need for advocacy by organised groups both 
within and without the Parliament to construct majorities.   
 
We then offered comparative insights notably drawing on our own previous work on 
the Bolkestein directive as well as the Port directive to provide some further evidence 
for these findings. The campaigns against these directives provide more examples 
where groups within and without the EP worked to construct effective majorities to 
amend or reject European legislation. In these cases too popular protest was critical 
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in building these majorities. In contrast, the opportunity structure which characterises 
the EU’s policy response to the 2008 financial crisis can be described as 
intergovernmental as it marginalised the EP. This, we argue, has precluded the 
effective opposition as the Occupy and Indignados movements have remained 
fragmented in various local movements with a global flavour but have ultimately 
remained unheard by national governments gathered in the Council and European 
Council. This contrasts with the former claim that the slogan ‘another Europe is 
possible’.  
 
If opportunities to mount these kinds of effective campaigns are indeed closing in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, further research on EU integration and its 
institutional developments should perhaps reflect on possible remedies for bringing 
contentious voices back to the EU level. Historically, according to thinkers such as T. 
H. Marshall and C. Tilly, contention has been an important driver for the 
democratisation of political systems. If the EU is to engage and involve its citizens – a 
political project that seems all the more urgent in light of the considerations made 
here – it must to some extent embrace the potential of contention. In this regard, it 
will be especially interesting to see, for example, whether the EP will be a satisfactory 
channel for the on-going protest against the TTIP. If contentious social movements 
were to turn their back on the idea that ‘Another Europe is possible’ this would leave 
only the far right articulating discontent as a return to the nation.  
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